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BOOK REVIEWS
who is qualified to teach it, and no one tries-although most such
schools have rather valuable library collections for its study, and
would make quite strenuous and expensive efforts to repair any gaps
that might be uncovered in them. The worship of our ancestors is
apparently in the debased form in which only the idols remain-well
preserved and cared-for, but with even their names unknown. Perhaps
it is as well. On the one hand, the law schools can concentrate on such
practical matters as "legal medicine" (How to Fake a Back Injury to
the irreverent), while on the other, there are the rich fields of inter-
disciplinary research, to say nothing of International Legal Studies.
But to carp like this is to be ungrateful." One should be very thank-
ful that there is at least one such person as Professor Dawson, and
that he has given us this fine book. Though it is not being too greedy,
I trust, to hope that he might sometime follow it up with another on
the same subject.
WILLIAM C. JONESt
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Paul A. Freund.
Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian Books. 1961. Pp. 224. $1.35.
Prominently mentioned among the candidates to ascend to the recent
vacancy on the Supreme Court was Professor Paul Freund of the
Harvard Law School. Although President Kennedy's first appointment
went to Deputy Attorney General White, it is quite possible that Pro-
fessor Freund may yet participate in the Court's deliberations-both
because of his undisputed eminence in the area of constitutional law,
and also his long established association with the President as a legal
advisor. Thus, his most recent work, The Supreme Court of the United
States, is deserving of attention not only as an excellent analysis of
the Court's role in our national life, but also as a guidepost in predict-
ing future judicial behavior.
There can be little doubt that Professor Freund is not in alliance
with that wing of the Court which speaks in terms of absolutes when
considering cases involving the Bill of Rights.1 The disharmonies be-
tween his position and that viewpoint which is generally attributed
to the "activist" wing would not, I believe, proceed along channels of
judicial restraint, as expounded by Justice Frankfurter and Judge
Hand,2 but rather find their source in a respect for a balancing or
8. Though I think it is justified to carp at the fact that there is no bibliography.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Mr. Justice Black's adherence to an interpretation of the Bill of Rights as
unmistakably absolute is contained in Black, The Bill of Rights 35 N.Y.U.L. REV.
865 (1960).
2. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 87-91 (1961) [herein-
after cited as FREUND]. See, for example, the concurring opinion of Justices
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"polarization" of the competing interests of liberty and order.4
Viewed in this sense Professor Freund appears to bridge the gap
between present day warring elements of the Court5
Professor Freund's attraction to what he calls "particularistic
analysis" rather than "illusory absolutes," while probably offensive to
many liberals, appears to make good sense. Two examples utilized
are the problems of prior restraint inherent in licensing statutes, and
the often troubling interplay of speech and authority involved in group
libel laws. Professor Freund wisely, I think, cautions the Court in
firing off sweeping generalizations against the regulation of constitu-
tional liberties. He would first focus attention on the existence of
clearly defined, relevant standards and safeguards.0 Similarly, he
notes the stresses, of which aphorisms are often oblivious, involved in
any consideration of group libel laws.7 With regard to the former, he
writes that:
In all these cases the Court is called on to weigh the claims of
public order and the exhortations of the non-conformist. The task
unfortunately cannot be performed by any mechanical device for
testing the centripetal and centrifugal forces in our community.
For the Court the problem is the fearful one of so measuring the
tensions, or so reviewing the measurements made by others, as not
to appear absurd in the sight of history.8
At the risk of being trite, I must here state the fundamental axiom
of which every lawyer is daily reminded. This axiom is a necessary
and primary concern for facts. I mention it because much of what
Professor Freund writes is a plea to the Court to pay attention to a
case's peculiarities. Despite the undisputed importance of this ap-
Frankfurter and Harlan in United Steelworkers of America v. United States,
361 U.S. 39,44 (1959). Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 175 (1960).
3. Professor Freund would probably react unfavorably to the word "balancing."
See FREUND at 187:
[I]n the field of compulsory disclosure, more particularly as it concerns legis-
lative investigations, there has been a hardening of positions on both sides:
on the part of one group, an absolutist protection from inquiry into member-
ships and associations is demanded; on the part of the other, a counterveiling
"balancing" of the public interest, which it quite regularly finds adequate to
warrant the questioning. The "balancing" figure, against which Justice Black
has repeatedly protested, is unfortunate if it assumes a choice between two
polarities; if a metaphor is wanted, a spectrum of tone would be more
promising of closer analysis and reconciliation.
4. FREUND at 44.
5. An instance of Professor Freund's compatibility with the "activist" wing
is apparent in his laudatory references to Chief Justice Warren's dissenting
opinion in the recent movie censorship case, Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365
U.S. 43 (1961); FREUND at 66-67.
6. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
7. Beauharnis v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
8. FREUND at 74.
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proach, it is submitted that Professor Freund's failure to emphasize
the presumption in favor of individual liberties accorded by the Bill
of Rights is an unfortunate omission.9 It is submitted that any judicial
quest for a reconciliation of interests must take into account the
Founding Fathers' propensity for unequivocal language in this area.
This can be recognized without pushing the logic of absolute prohibi-
tion to absurdity.
All of this is not to deprecate Professor Freund's desire that the
Court practice a Lincolnesque detachment and avoidance for im-
mediate attachments. Nor is it meant to detract in any way from the
proper concern of both Professor Freund and Justice Frankfurter that
the Court remain intact as a symbol and teacher. But, as Justice Black
has continually warned, the indulgence in a refusal to heed the Con-
stitution and its sensitivity to the needs of people confronted with a
potentially oppressive state can only take us down the road to the
worst kind of judicial interference. I mean judge-made natural law.
Mr. Justice Clark, concurring in the recent reapportionment case, cor-
rectly observed the Court's function as a protector of those who are
not able to seek redress from the state when he wrote the following:
It is well for this Court to practice self-restraint and discipline in
constitutional adjudication, but never in its history have those
principles received sanction where the national rights of so many
have been so clearly infringed for so long a time. National respect
for the courts is more enhanced through forthright enforcement
of those rights rather than by rendering them nugatory through
the interposition of subterfuges. In my view the ultimate decision
today is in the greatest tradition of this Court."°
WILLIAM B. GOULDt
LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS AT WORK. Morris Stone. New
York: 1961. Pp. 307. $5.50.
To some, the title, Labor-Management Contracts at Work, may
appear to be a misnomer. The book does not deal with the parties'
day-by-day compliance with the terms of their agreement; nor does
it concern itself with how to achieve such compliance without resort
to litigation (arbitration). The books deals-as its subtitle reveals-
with "an analysis of cases and awards" of arbitrators in labor-
management disputes under such agreements; it is, therefore, a study
of labor-management contracts in litigation in the forum which the
9. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
10. Baker v. Carr (Decided March 28, 1962); contra, Bickel, The Great Re-
apportionment Case, The New Republic, April 9, 1962. Professor Freund might
well have been in disagreement with the majority opinion. FREUND at 178.
t Assistant General Counsel, United Auto Workers, AFL-CIO.
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